The Principle of Dwindling Probabilities and the Kalam

The blog Debunking William Lane Craig mentioned a very interesting problem with Craig's Kalam Cosmological Argument:

"If it’s impossible for something to arise from nothing – and impossible for nothing to exist in the first place – then how can Craig justify the belief that God created the universe from nothing"

The blogger later added something to the effect of: Craig must argue that a God creating something from nothing is more plausible than nothing creating something from nothing, but of course if that is true then God creating from nothing seems to be (at best) only marginally more plausible than nothing creating something from nothing. I posted a comment:

"I think that this is part of what is perhaps the most fatal objection to Craig’s argument: Craig is continually forced to argue that this or that premise of his argument is more plausible than its contradictory. But often we find that his premises are, at best, only marginally more plausible than their contradictories. And so Craig’s argument falls on the horns of the Principle of Dwindling Probabilities.

"Because he must rely on several propositions which are open to MUCH doubt (infinities cannot exist, A-Theory of time is correct, your example, etc.) his conclusion necessarily contains as much doubts as all of the premises do. And the total amount of doubt is quite high. Indeed, it is high enough to completely sink the whole argument."